It’s much more painful to talk about disappointments, because the opportunities and possibilities provided by the Orange revolution were considerable and yet have been only minimally realised. During the first year after the Orange revolution newly elected President Yushchenko had a unique chance to appoint and to lead an effective executive, to form a loyal majority in parliament and to initiate a wide range of reforms necessary for Ukraine, including unpopular reforms. The preconditions for these policies were a high degree of support by Ukrainian citizens and favorable attitudes by Ukraine’s Western partners to the new government. To succeed, the new authorities should have, firstly, prepared a strategic plan of urgent measures, and secondly, created a united team of highly skilled government managers with high moral standards encapsulated by the ideals of the Orange Revolution.

Neither task was accomplished. Only a few people that came to power after the Orange revolution met these new moral criteria and a majority of the newcomers were no different from their predecessors, except that they were less experienced and professional. The new authorities failed to execute the most sensitive (for Orange Revolution participants) promise of ‘Criminals will go to jail!’ On the contrary, soon after the Orange revolution those believed to be criminals quickly returned to power and were seen on television screens. Instead of unity of the Orange Revolution coalition Ukrainians saw permanent conflicts and back-room negotiations with former opponents. The 2006 and 2007 elections worsened the attitude of citizen’s to the authorities.

According to polls conducted by the Razumkov Centre, in February 2005 50.7 percent of Ukrainians considered that the country was moving in the right way whereas by October 2008 only 5.3 percent held the same opinion. Ukrainians do not expect anything good from the authorities and rely upon themselves. Further elections next year will only worsen this outlook. 

Ukraine Analyst, 30 November 2008

“Unfortunately, there were no comments either by Gazprom or by Naftohaz Ukrayiny on the debt structure. Meanwhile, the difference in debt estimation given by Russia and Ukraine officials amounts to over one billion dollars. We can merely guess at how the difference came up,” V. Saprykin said.

The expert told that RosUkrEnergo has claimed its debt for the current month ahead of schedule. November debt must be repaid on Dec. 25, so RosUkrEnergo has declared Ukraine’s November debt too early. Besides, RosUkrEnergo has imposed sanctions for allegedly belated payments for gas. This explains the difference. Perhaps, there are other details of which we are not aware,” the expert hinted.

It goes without saying that Ukraine must pay for the gas it consumed. Naftohaz must immediately pay for the undisputed part of gas. This will open the way to further cooperation with Russia and the signing of supply contracts for 2009. As for the disputed part of the debt, it should be analyzed by experts and this is a standard procedure, Saprykin added.